EU MEMBER STATES RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Source: European Values (2018)

Kremlin Friends: Do not feel threatened and are advocating for better relations with Russia, often regardless [of] what atrocities Moscow is responsible for. Often support Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives, such as stopping further sanctions under arguments related to appeasement or alleged business ties."

1. Cyprus: Cyprus does not feel threatened and is advocating for better relations with Russia. Often supports Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives, such as stopping further sanctions under arguments related to appeasement or alleged business ties. Cyprus belongs to the group of countries which do not perceive any threat coming from Russia and keep a close relationship with the regime. Russia has supported integrity of the island since the Soviet era, which makes Moscow a key foreign partner of Nicosia. Cyprus is also Russia's primary offshore banking haven, home to 40.000 Russians and a popular destination for Russian tourists. The government opposed sanctions against Russia, especially because of the economic ties, although the actual impact of them on the economy has been limited. However, there is a continuing Russian intelligence's activity in the country and the Cypriot side fears that Moscow is using social and mass media and its ties to fringe nationalist parties and the Greek Orthodox Church to undermine the settlement talks.
2. Greece: Greece does not feel threatened and is advocating for better relations with Russia. Often supports Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives, such as stopping further sanctions under arguments related to appeasement or alleged business ties. Greece is one of the oldest NATO member states and the first Balkan state to join the EU. Greece’s difficult history with Turkey has urged it to look to Russia for support, although this has changed with recent Turkish friendliness with Russia. Both Greece and Russia have taken an interest to each other throughout history. While the countries have been friendly in the past, this turned into outright support with the election of Syriza in 2015. Consequently, Greece has typically expressed opposition to any EU measures that could alienate Russia. The current Greek government, caught in the middle of a severe economic and financial crisis, has courted Russia in hopes of receiving aid that Brussels has failed to provide (and thereby also gain negotiation leverage). Greece is thus best described as one of the EU’s three ‘Kremlin friendlies’, together with Italy and Cyprus. For all this, Greece nonetheless remains committed to the EU and NATO, despite its extensive efforts to simultaneously maintain warm bilateral relations with Russia. According to the latest Eurobarometer, 66% of Greeks had a positive view of Russia. A poll from the University of Macedonia found that 67% of Greeks have positive opinions of Putin

Countries in denial: "[A] critical mass of the governing politicians denies or systematically underplays existence of the threat. The governments are not concerned with disinformation and influence operations; they do not consider them a threat and take no steps to counter them. The intelligence services are not concerned with hostile interference and subversion.

1. Austria: Austria is a non-NATO EU member state with a long tradition of neutrality throughout the Cold War. Its relations with Russia have not suffered significantly due to the situation in Ukraine. In particular, energy interests continue to shape the two countries’ relationship and remain a cornerstone of Austrian diplomacy with Russia. For this reason, Austria is sceptical about the EU sanctions regime against Russia and is less concerned than other EU member states about the threat Russia poses to European stability. The FPÖ maintains close contacts to the Kremlin. Public support for Russia remains low: according to the latest Eurobarometer, 28% of Austrians had a positive view of Russia
2. Hungary: Hungary has negative historical experience with Russia, but the government uses relations with Moscow for domestic political or economic reasons, or as a tool against the EU establishment. The attitude of Hungarian public to Russia is generally hostile and the country remains dedicated to NATO, not least due to their troubled past marked with Russian occupation during the Communist era. However, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban uses good relations with Russia as a leverage in Hungary's relations with Brussels and in order to support his own authoritarian policies. It is a pragmatic fit since the Kremlin is known to support Eurosceptic and autocratic elements of European politics. After the annexation of Crimea, the Prime Minister sought to weaken European sanctions against Russia. Also, the far-right Jobbik party inclines towards Moscow and promotes the Kremlin in the country, reportedly receiving Russian financial support.
3. Italy:  Italy does not feel threatened and is advocating for better relations with Russia. Often supports Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives, such as stopping further sanctions under arguments related to appeasement or alleged business ties. Though traditionally a country with deep economic ties to Russia, Italy showed a strong support for a common EU and NATO stance on Russia. At the same time, Italy does not wish to completely alienate Russia, and it believes that a dialogue is possible. Still, Italy has shown disapproval towards Russian actions in Syria, but its national security is more concerned with the refugee flow over Mediterranean than with any immediate threats which Russia may pose to Italy. Italian politics is full of pro-Russian elements and many politicians believe that the EU sanctions are harmful to Italy, and therefore they should be lifted
4. Luxembourg: Historical, energy-related or economically special relations with Russia. Neither feels threatened and nor acknowledges the threat, outside the conflict in Ukraine. Luxembourg is one of the founding nations of NATO and the EU nations, and one of the three Benelux states. Reputed primarily as a tax haven and banking hub, Luxembourg is a small and militarily insignificant country whose primary source of economic prosperity derives from its financial services. Due to high levels of investment from Russia (and vice versa), Luxembourg is reluctant to implement EU measures aimed at restricting shady financials from Russia. However, although Luxembourg relies considerably on Russian financing, it supports common EU policies designed to penalize Russia for violating international law. Luxembourgian officials have also expressed hope that peace in Ukraine is attainable, and that Russia and Ukraine will reach compromise over their disagreements. Within the EU, Luxembourg’s relationship with Russia is best summarized as ‘trying to stay away from the issues’. According to the latest Eurobarometer, 21% of the public in Luxembourg had a positive view of Russia
5. Malta: Geographically distant from Russia and has almost no interest in any of the related issues. Malta is a small country dependent on oil imports, of which Russia takes the biggest share. Malta’s relations with Russia are insignificant. The Maltese government emphasizes the EU’s mediating role in the Ukraine crisis.
6. Portugal: Geographically distant from Russia and has almost no interest in any of the related issues. Portugal is one of the founding NATO member states and one of the westernmost EU member states. The country’s distance from Russia makes it generally less aware of the issues at the Union’s eastern borders. It is generally independent from Russian fossil fuels. Portugal is generally unconcerned with Russia, and it remains outside of immediate Russian interests as well.
7. Slovenia: Trying to stay away from the issues. Historical, energy-related or economically special relations with Russia. Does not feel threatened and does not acknowledge the threat outside of the conflict of Ukraine. Even after the annexation of Crimea, Slovenia maintained pragmatic energy-focused economic ties with Russia despite claiming that it fully supports Ukrainian integrity and the Minsk agreements. It also supports lifting the sanctions against the Russian Federation. Slovenes lack the negative historical experiences with Russian occupation; on the contrary, they have a certain sense of shared Slavic identity and appreciation for the contribution of the Red Army in liberating part of Slovenia. Therefore, Slovenian politicians stress “mutual respect for different opinions” in relations with Russia. The Presidents or Prime Ministers of the two countries meet regularly.

The hesitant: "[Have] concerns about Russia, but given complicated historical, economic, or geographical relations, have most of the time stayed away from being vocal about the Russian aggression."

1. Belgium: Trying to stay away from the issues. Historical, energy-related or economically special relations with Russia. Neither feels threatened and nor acknowledges the threat, outside the conflict in Ukraine. Though historically a pragmatist in its relations with Russia, Belgium is growing increasingly aware of the threat that Russia poses to the European Union. The conflict in Ukraine has made Belgium more eager to support Kyiv in the EU context and back pan-European measures to counter Russian aggression. However, the country’s geographic distance from the Russian border, combined with internal political difficulties as well as the threat of Islamist terrorism, mean that Belgium does not perceive Russia as a primary security threat. Nonetheless, Belgium does not deny that Russia poses a serious security challenge to Europe, and maintains a particular concern with Russian intelligence activities within its borders. According to the latest Eurobarometer, 26% of Belgians had a positive view of Russia.
2. Bulgaria: Concerns about Russia, but given complicated historical relations and local context, has most of the time stayed away from being vocal about the Russian aggression. Bulgaria is a more recent EU and NATO member with deep historical and cultural ties to Russia. Bulgaria is highly dependent on Russian fossil fuels; thus far, however, the government has steadfastly followed EU guidelines and rejected several Russian pipeline projects. Though not explicitly pro-Russian, the political mainstream in Bulgaria seeks to reconcile a firm pro-EU and pro-NATO stance with friendly relations with Russia. Bulgaria considers sanctions an obstacle for its own economy. At the same time, over the past few years, Bulgaria has grown increasingly aware of the threat Russia poses to the rest of Europe. Yet thanks to the deep penetration of Russian interests in the economy, combined with domestic corruption, Bulgaria must also contend with powerful Russian efforts to influence policy. This situation of ‘state capture’ further complicates Bulgaria’s response to malign Russian influence. As such, Bulgaria’s relationship with Russia is best described as ‘below-radar supporter’, where concerns are tempered by historical relations and local context, and there is avoidance of vocal criticism. According to the latest Eurobarometer, 72% of Bulgarians had a positive view of Russia. On the other hand, another poll found that Bulgarians “do not believe that Russia can be a model for development
3. Croatia: Concerns about Russia, but given complicated historical relations and local context, has most of the time stayed away from being vocal about the Russian aggression. Croatia has been wary with the Russian Federation since it gained independence in 1991 because of its involvement in Serbia, while sustaining good relations on a business level. They lost a significant part of common ground after the occupation of Crimea began. Recently, Croatia started to express concerns about Russia's frequent joint military exercises with Serbia. The country has also been attempting to become an alternative supplier of gas for the Central, Eastern and Southern Europe instead to Russia. Croatia has been generally supportive of the EU actions against the Russian Federation and condemned the violence in Ukraine. After the related sanctions were put into place, the Croatian Ambassador to Moscow declared that Croatia shares the EU principles and does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. The political representation kept their stance on sanctions being strictly dependent on implementation of Minsk agreements.
4. Ireland: Geographically distant from Russia and has almost no interest in any of the related issues. Ireland’s position towards Russia is barely visible, but in most questions of international relations Irish politics tend to seek a common ground with the United Kingdom. The only interest Ireland has in Russia is primarily commercial, but when it comes to defense measures, Ireland tends to rely heavily on the UK’s military, but so far Ireland remains uninterested in abandoning its neutrality policy.
5. Slovakia: Government using Russia-card for domestic reasons. While these countries have predominantly negative historical experience with Russia, the government uses relations with Moscow for domestic political and/or economic reasons, or as a tool against the EU establishment. Slovakia belongs to the group of countries that were formerly part of the Eastern bloc and had negative historical experience with the Russian Federation. It is a firm supporter of the counter measures against Russia taken by the EU and NATO following the annexation of Crimea. However, energy dependence and economic ties with Russia lead to occasional capitulation on the Slovak side, for example in the case of the deployment of the US missile shield. Hence, Slovakia remains one of the most pro-Russian countries in the EU. There are pro-Russian fringe elements present in Slovak politics, such as ex Communist politicians who continue to harbour sympathies for Russia.

The awakened: "These countries have significantly updated their policies and concerns following Russian aggression in Ukraine."

1. Czech Republic: The stance of the Czech Republic towards Russia changed significantly following the crisis in Ukraine and Russia´s subsequent annexation of Crimea. Despite the ambivalent positions of some individual politicians, as well as a high dependence on imports from Russia, the country is fully aware of the threats Russia poses. However, pro-Russian president Miloš Zeman plays a significant role in maintaining relations with the Kremlin, having denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine after the Crimean annexation, and repeatedly criticising the EU sanctions against Russia, Zeman also retained strong ties to Russian business.
2. Denmark: Relations between Russia and Denmark have been relatively cool ever since Putin’s rise to power, spoiled either by the war in Chechnya, human rights concerns, or Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Today, Denmark remains a firm supporter of the international sanctions against Russia after its aggressive action in Ukraine. As of this year, a number of Nordic countries including Denmark have addressed the threat of Russian disinformation and have taken measures to counter this assault. Nevertheless, Denmark is not an important direct target for Russia, and although disinformation is being addressed extensively in Denmark, it is primarily within the general threat of Russian influence campaigns against the West, rather than to Denmark specifically. Moreover, Denmark – as well as the Baltic countries, Sweden, and Finland – faces potential military threats from Russia if escalation occurs. The country’s geopolitical location with the Baltic Sea might become especially strategic if Russian aggression continues.
3. Finland: Finland is a country that is connected with Russia economically, politically, historically and geographically (Finland shares a 1340 km long border with Russia). Due to Finland's dependence on Russian supplies of fossil fuels and very strong economic relations (despite sanctions, Russia is the fifth most important destination for Finnish exports), the Finns are trying to maintain friendly relations with Russia. On the other hand, the Finns are well aware of the military threat that Russia poses, which is reflected by their growing ties to NATO
4. France: Historical, energy-related or economically special relations with Russia. Does not feel threatened and does not acknowledge the threat, outside of the conflict of Ukraine. France has taken a harsher tone with Russia after Russian influence in the French Presidential election. Though traditionally friendly towards Russia, France’s stance grew chillier after the 2014 events in Ukraine. French politicians are not without allegations of financial or intelligence ties to Russia, even though the government’s stance suffered through a radical U-turn on Russia following the annexation of Crimea. France was one of the key countries to initiate the EU sanctions against Russia, but also one of the main countries to participate in negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and pro-Russian separatists. In 2014, France decided to call off a deal with Russia regarding a sale of Mistral warships. Facing other issues than Russia, France’s national security focus is less concerned with Russian threats to the EU bloc and more with terrorism. Meanwhile, eurosceptics and the far-right remain relatively popular, even with the alleged support by Russian intelligence. The main far-left party in France, led by Jean-Luc Melenchon, is drawn towards Putin’s anti-Americanism and considers sanctions against Russia to be “illegal.
5. Germany: Though traditionally more skeptical about the threat posed by Russia than its eastern neighbours, Germany was a proponent of tough EU measures against Russia in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and its invasion of the Donbass. Germany has witnessed a significant deterioration in relations with Russia in recent years, intensified by Russian attempts to spread fake news, launch cyberattacks against the Bundestag’s IT systems, and influence the country’s internal political affairs (e.g., by backing populist parties, other pro Russian groups through its network of contacts, and by founding own organisations). According to latest public opinion polls, however, only 28% of German citizens trust Russia as a national partner, while 67% say that Russia cannot be trusted. Russia remains Germany’s largest energy supplier, even though Germany was one of the first countries to advocate for better energy security during Russia’s natural gas disputes with Ukraine over the last decade. However, this effort has ended after German authorities under the newly formed grand coalition have given their final approval for building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. These are worrisome developments that put not only European energy security at risk, but also have the potential to drive a wedge between European countries on a political level.
6. Netherlands: Significantly shifted its policies and concerns after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Netherlands are generally too distant from Russia to concern themselves with the issue of immediate Russian threats. So far, the major dimension of Russo-Dutch relations has been economic. However, the downing of MH17 and Russian behavior in its investigation worsened the two countries’ relations. Though it is one of the more Euroskeptic Western European nations, the Netherlands did raise concern that Russia’s behavior threatens international order and the integrity of the EU. This has pushed the Dutch to become more aware of and more concerned by Russian threats. Furthermore, the Netherlands are hesitant but generally supportive of the common EU stance on Russia, even though the Dutch still believe that political reforms and democratic transformations in Russia are possible in the future.
7. Poland: Held concerned views of Russian foreign policy and now is at the forefront of the European response to its aggression. Even though Poland was a part of the Eastern bloc for a long time, it does not hold a lot of sympathies towards Russia. The Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 and the Katyn Massacre in 1940 left deep scars in the modern history of the two countries. The chilly relations with the Kremlin have been later underlined by the death of former Polish president Lech Kaczynski and other Polish high officials in a plane crash in Smolensk in 2010 and even more after the annexation of Crimea. The government showed full support for sanctions against Russia. The wariness of the Eastern power is intensive also because of the Polish borders with the Kaliningrad Oblast. Because of the security concerns caused by being at the frontier, Poland requested for increased presence of NATO in the country and increased its military spending from 1.6 % GDP in 2013 to 2 % today with even more increases in defence spending in the years to come. Hence, the US forces are deployed in the country as a deterrence, which is perceived by the Kremlin as an aggression and a threat.
8. Romania: Concerns about Russia, but given complicated historical relations and local context, has most of the time stayed away from being vocal about the Russian aggression. Romania has been an EU and NATO member state since 2004. The country’s high domestic fossil fuel reserves make the question of energy secondary in Romania’s relations with Russia. Romania’s primary concern is with its immediate neighbourhood. It was supportive of pro-EU and pro-NATO measures in Georgia, and with forming a common Black Sea partnership within Europe. Moldova, Transnistria, and EU expansion are the defining issues of Romania’s foreign policy. As Chisinau’s foremost advocate in Europe, Romania’s interests in Moldova’s accession to the EU have clashed with Russia’s desire to maintain the frozen conflict in Transnistria. Romania remains dedicated to deeper ties with the US and NATO, as well as with its Black Sea partners, such as Georgia and Ukraine. Within the EU context, Romania’s relationship with Russia is best described as ‘below-radar supporter’, where concerns are tempered by historical relations and local context. According to Eurobarometer, 53% of Romanians have a positive view of Russia, while 41% have a negative view. Recently, however, nationalist tendencies have once again acquired mainstream acceptance, through social media channels and the voices of some opinion leaders. Some of these outlets have no overt pro-Kremlin inclination but “create a particularly fertile ground for pro-Kremlin media and serve as multipliers for narratives that promote the Kremlin’s goal of weakening Romania’s pro Western sentiment.”
9. Spain: Trying to stay away from the issues. Historical, energy-related or economically special relations with Russia. Does not feel threatened and does not acknowledge the threat, outside of the conflict of Ukraine. Spain is an EU and NATO member state located in the westernmost part of Europe. Being located far away from Russia and not affected by the same fears as the easternmost EU member states, Spain remains focused on engaging in dialogue with Russia. This, however, does not negate Spain’s concern with Russian military build-up and Russia’s actions in Ukraine. At the same time, Spain remains sceptical over possible European expansion, and Russia’s status as a strategic partner in the fight against terrorism has left a mark on Spain’s attitude of hesitance in making strong moves to counter Russian threat. However, this is more of a sign of the lack of any serious ties with Russia, rather than Spanish attempts to oppose other EU member states who have real concerns over Russian threats. Economy wise, Russia does not play a significant role in Spanish energy imports, but Russian tourism plays a big role in the Spanish economy. Thus, Spain was one of the several countries to voice criticism against anti-Russian sanctions, but so far, Spain joined other EU nations in supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The full-scale defenders: "Held concerned views of Russian foreign policy and now are at the forefront of the European response to its aggression."

1. Estonia: Estonia has suffered from cyber-attacks by Russia in the past and it is often seen as one of the first victims of the “hybrid war” tactics. Its sizeable Russian minority and the Estonian government’s naturalization policies are often brought up by Russian diplomats in order to paint Estonia as a human rights violator. Russia plays a significant role in shaping Estonian national security policy, and the events of 2014 in Ukraine only assured Estonia that its fears were justified. Estonia and Russia still share “bad blood” due to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries, which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The tension grew even thicker when Estonia allied with NATO in 2004.
2. Latvia: Held concerned views over Russian foreign policy and is now at the forefront of the European response to its aggression. Latvia was one of the first ex-Soviet states to join NATO in 2004 and remains a key NATO member state, sharing a border with Russia and Belarus. Latvia is the most Russified of the Baltic States. Like Estonia, it has a sizeable Russian minority (including non-citizens) living in the country. Due to its geographic location and problematic infrastructure, Latvia was traditionally dependent on Russian fossil fuels. Russian intelligence, fake news, and disinformation are all very prevalent in the area. Still, Latvia is highly active in NATO efforts to counter Russian threats and supports the sanctions against Russia for the annexation of Crimea.
3. Lithuania: Held concerned views of Russian foreign policy and now is at the forefront of the European response to its aggression. Like its two Baltic neighbours, Lithuania was one of the few ex-Soviet states to join the EU and NATO in 2004. Lithuania’s strategic location between the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and the Republic of Belarus contributes to its acute awareness of threats posed by the Russian military. Moreover, Russian spy networks remain heavily active in Lithuania, although its Russian minority (at only 6%) is considerably smaller than that of Latvia or Estonia. Lithuania stands in the avant-garde of EU and NATO states in raising awareness about the Russian threat, while also rapidly implementing measures to lower national dependence on Russian energy supplies. Lithuania has been one of the chief advocates for an EU treaty with Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea only intensified its concern and preparation for a potential hybrid attack by Russia. Lithuania is highly supportive of the EU sanctions regime and eager to aid Ukraine. Overall, Lithuania shares frosty political relations with Russia, and maintains a strong internal political and social consensus on mitigating Russian aggression and on related security issues. Within the EU, Lithuania is one of six ‘principled defenders’ at the helm of the European response to Russian aggression, together with its Baltic neighbours, Poland, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
4. Sweden: Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden condemned Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and began rethinking its own defence policy, examining the country’s strategic vulnerability after a series of Russian military probes entered Swedish waters and airspace. Sweden’s interest in Russia is primarily concerned with human rights, the economy, and energy, though the latter plays a far less significant role since Sweden’s energy imports are very diverse.
5. United Kingdom: The UK was quick to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, as well as in Syria, and its firm stance remains unchanged even after the political reshuffle following the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. Russia does not play the key role in British security or international policy, but Britain is aware of threats posed by Russia in Europe and the Middle East, and it is an active member of NATO efforts to counter these threats.