LEBANESE AGENDA

1. The question of extending the ceasefire agreement
2. A halt by Israel to demolition operations in southern villages and towns
3. A complete cessation of Israeli attacks
4. Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory
5. The return of prisoners
6. Deployment of the army to the international borders
7. Reconstruction of what was destroyed during this war.

Negotiations in Washington

Off the record, everyone knows that the Washington table will not be neutral. The United States is simultaneously the host, the facilitator, and Israel's main ally. Lebanon, for its part, arrives with a state ravaged by war, more than a million displaced persons, a truce already contested on the ground, and a domestic scene rife with the country's most explosive issue: Hezbollah's weapons, the sovereignty of the state, and the political cost of direct dialogue with the Israeli enemy

Ce que la France apporte encore au Liban

Lebanon must simultaneously achieve military stability, defend its territorial sovereignty, limit humanitarian damage, avoid an internal split with Hezbollah, and preserve diplomatic room for maneuver going forward. France can reiterate that negotiations on Lebanon cannot be treated as a mere adjunct to Israeli security. This does not mean that Paris is advocating an anti-Israeli stance. It means that it wants the Washington table to also discuss Lebanon as a state, and not just as a Hezbollah stronghold.

What France still brings to Lebanon

France's usefulness stems first and foremost from the history of the issue. The relationship between Paris and Beirut is not merely sentimental or based on memory. It rests on long-standing political channels, a deep understanding of Lebanese personnel, a presence within UNIFIL, access to Europeans, and an ability to speak both the language of Lebanese sovereignty and that of institutional strengthening. This is a specific advantage. The United States can exert more influence on Israel. France, for its part, understands better than others the internal fragilities of the Lebanese system and how external negotiations can generate dangerous political repercussions. This internal dimension is essential. Several European and Lebanese diplomats have expressed their fear that an overly weakened Lebanese government could find itself exposed to unrealistic demands from Washington. This concern is not theoretical. It strikes at the very heart of the Lebanese system. The disarmament of Hezbollah, the army's presence in the south, the return of displaced persons, prisoners, the disputed border points, the status of areas occupied by Israel: each of these issues could become a source of national tension in Beirut. France can therefore play the role of an intellectual and diplomatic buffer. It can remind Beirut that certain poorly prepared concessions would be impossible to implement within the country. It can also convey to the Europeans that overly harsh negotiations, or those presented as a capitulation, would fuel precisely what the West claims to want to avoid: further internal polarization, a delegitimization of the state, and a strengthening of the narrative of armed resistance. French aid is not only defensive. It can also be positive. Paris still has the credibility to coordinate security, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction. And Lebanon needs precisely this coordination. A truce will not hold if it remains purely military. This aid must be accompanied by support for displaced persons, assistance to municipalities, support for the Lebanese army, and a prospect of return for the populations of the South. France is not the only actor on these issues, but it remains one of the few capable of linking the political, humanitarian, and European dimensions.

French Support for the Army and the International Framework

Another aspect of this support lies in the institutional framework that Paris continues to defend. France explicitly supports the continuation of discussions between Israel and Lebanon with a view to a political solution that includes Israeli withdrawal and the disarmament of Hezbollah. This formulation is important because it brings together two imperatives that are often separated. On the one hand, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. On the other, the restoration of the state's monopoly on the use of force. Paris is not choosing between Lebanese sovereignty and the limitation of Hezbollah. It is trying to place them in the same sequence. For Beirut, this balance is crucial. It helps avoid two opposing pitfalls. The first would be to speak only of the disarmament of Hezbollah without first demanding an end to Israeli attacks and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the South. The second would be to speak only of the Israeli occupation while neglecting the question of the state's effective authority. French diplomacy, through its wording, underscores that no lasting stabilization is possible if one of these two aspects overshadows the other. This point ties into the question of the Lebanese army. France is among the partners who believe that a lasting resolution to the crisis requires strengthening state institutions, first and foremost the army. Again, this does not produce an immediate solution. But it gives Lebanon a key argument in the negotiations: the alternative to Hezbollah cannot be a vacuum. If the international community wants to reduce the Shiite movement's military role, it must more seriously support the Lebanese state's capacity to control the territory, secure border areas, and protect civilians.

Why Washington and Israel prefer to limit Paris: If France can provide this service, why isn't it at the table? The answer is political. Both Israel and the United States have shown that they prefer a more limited format. From the Israeli perspective, Paris has become a less convenient partner. Relations have deteriorated due to French positions on Gaza and the West Bank, criticism of the perceived disproportionate nature of some Israeli strikes in Lebanon, and France's continued contacts with Hezbollah's political wing. For Jerusalem, this profile makes Paris too nuanced an actor, and therefore less useful in a sequence focused on Israeli security and the weakening of Hezbollah. From the American perspective, the logic is slightly different, but the effect is the same. Washington seeks to maintain complete control of the process. The United States wants to dictate the pace, format, and language of the discussions. Adding France would introduce another Western center of gravity, with different priorities, different sensitivities, and a stronger emphasis on international law, civilians, UNIFIL, and reconstruction. However, the current American format is designed to move quickly, engage in bilateral discussions, and produce, if possible, a clear security outcome.

Lebanon is paying the price. By accepting the Washington framework without conditioning its participation on Paris's presence, Beirut made a choice driven more by necessity than preference. Lebanese officials know that the only power capable of directly influencing Israel today remains the United States. They cannot, therefore, afford to boycott the American table. But they also know that this choice deprives them of a valuable Western counterweight. France could not have reversed the balance of power. However, it could have altered the narrative and the hierarchy. A simpler, but tougher table. This is perhaps the best way to summarize the situation. With France absent, the Washington table becomes simpler. It is also tougher. The United States appears there as mediator, potential guarantor, and ally of Israel all at once. Israel arrives with a military advantage, an army present in southern Lebanon, and an intact capacity to exert pressure. Lebanon, on the other hand, comes with a priority demand for stabilization, an urgent need for humanitarian aid, and a fractured domestic scene. In such a context, French diplomacy serves at least one purpose: to bolster Lebanon's position before the crucial moment. Even if Paris is not at the negotiating table, its support can help Beirut avoid appearing as a state merely begging for mercy. It can help the country reframe the negotiations not as a bargaining chip on Lebanon's weakness, but as a process that must produce two inseparable outcomes: security for Israel and sovereignty for Lebanon. It is also a way for France to defend its own position in the Middle East. Lebanon is one of the few issues where Paris still maintained a clear presence, based on history, diplomacy, UNIFIL, and its capacity for European mobilization. Being excluded from the room where the strategic framework of South Lebanon is being redefined is a real loss. By assisting Beirut proactively, France also seeks to demonstrate that it remains relevant, even when no longer at the forefront.

What Beirut Seeks in Washington

The question is obviously not only about France's role. It is also about the very purpose of the negotiations. For Lebanon, the immediate priority remains consolidating the ceasefire, the Israeli withdrawal, the return of displaced persons, and reducing the military pressure that continues to weigh on the South and, more broadly, on the country. For Israel, the objectives are formulated differently: preventing Hezbollah from redeploying, securing northern Israel, and achieving progress on the lasting limitation of the movement's arsenal and military presence. These two agendas do not overlap. This is why Washington can quickly become a source of misunderstanding. Beirut wants first and foremost to stop the bleeding. Israel wants to use the war to redefine the balance of power. France, in this context, can help Lebanon keep this hierarchy in mind. If the Lebanese delegation too quickly agrees to shift the discussion solely to Israeli strategic issues, it risks leaving without any tangible benefits for civilians, displaced persons, or territorial sovereignty. President Joseph Aoun himself set the tone for this approach, explaining that the ceasefire must be transformed into permanent agreements preserving the rights of the Lebanese people, the unity of their territory, and their sovereignty. This formulation does not preclude ambitious discussions. However, it serves as a reminder that, for Beirut, no progress will be politically defensible if it appears as a concession on territory or as a peace imposed under fire. This internal risk, which Paris is well aware of, is where French experience becomes useful once again. Paris knows that Lebanese politics cannot be interpreted as simple state-to-state diplomacy. Every external advance has repercussions on sectarian, partisan, and institutional balances. A poorly calibrated concession can be seen as a betrayal. Negotiations conducted too quickly can be denounced as a capitulation. Conversely, total paralysis can strengthen those who say that only force protects the country. Hezbollah is not directly at the table with Washington, but it remains a factor due to its domestic influence, its military capacity, and its ability to challenge the legitimacy of any negotiation it deems directed against it.

Nawaf Salam acknowledged this in his own way, explaining that he was not seeking confrontation with the movement while simultaneously asserting that he would not be intimidated. This is a fine line. It requires precisely what France can offer: political support, diplomatic preparation, and an understanding of the thresholds beyond which the Lebanese equation becomes unstable. France can help, but not guarantee. However, we must not overestimate what Paris can do. France is not in a position to guarantee an Israeli withdrawal on its own, to silence the guns, or to impose a different negotiating framework on Washington. Its influence is real, but limited. It can support, advise, and mobilize Europeans, strengthen the discourse of sovereignty, and prepare for the future. It cannot replace the American leverage. This limitation is essential because it prevents any illusions. French aid to Lebanon in Washington will not be that of a decisive patron. It will be that of a preparatory ally, a European intermediary, a source of political support that can make Lebanon's position less vulnerable, but not reverse it. This is not insignificant. In an asymmetrical negotiation, a few points of method, language, and sequencing can make a big difference. The real question, therefore, is less whether Paris can save Beirut than what its support can prevent. It can prevent Lebanon from arriving without a framework. It can prevent humanitarian and territorial priorities from disappearing behind the sole Israeli security agenda. It can prevent the Lebanese state from presenting itself as purely supplicating. And it can remind Europe that it is not its role to finance Lebanon after the fact if it allows the terms of the future security order in the Global South to be determined today without its involvement. A useful alliance before the Washington test. The Paris meeting is thus more of a signal than a turning point. France has not returned to the center of the game. But it is showing that it refuses to let Lebanon enter alone into a discussion where the balance of power is against it.

 For Beirut, this public display of closeness with Emmanuel Macron carries both an external and internal message. Externally, it signifies that Lebanon is not entirely isolated in the face of the American-Israeli alliance. Internally, it allows the government to demonstrate that it is not acting without support and a diplomatic safety net. This scene is also significant because it unfolds while the truce remains fragile. Israeli strikes have not completely ceased. Hezbollah has retaliated in recent days, citing Israeli violations. The Bekaa Valley has been hit again. The South remains plagued by destruction, the Israeli military presence, and uncertainty about the lasting return of its inhabitants. Under these conditions, any negotiation is, first and foremost, a negotiation under duress. France does not alter this fact. However, it can help Lebanon avoid passively accepting this situation. Perhaps this, ultimately, is the true meaning of the commitment announced in Paris. In a region where the negotiating table almost always reflects the balance of military power, Beirut is seeking support to avoid reducing its diplomacy to merely managing its weakness. Paris cannot provide it with strength. But it can still lend it a framework, coherence, and a degree of depth as it enters Washington.